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Notes and Comments
Eugene Forsey* In Defence of Macdonald's
Constitution
To-night I propose to sing the praises of the Canadian Constitution
of 1867.
I call it "Macdonald's Constitution" for two reasons.
The first is that, though of course it was the work of all the
Fathers of Confederation, Macdonald, incontestably, was the chief
architect.
The second is that what I am concerned to defend is the basic
document Macdonald left us: Macdonald's Constitution as distinct
from Haldane's; Macdonald's Constitution before it was defaced
and ravaged by the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council;
before it was distorted by those wicked Stepfathers of Confedera-
tion.
Does it need defence? Yes. Against what? Against the demands
voiced, notably, by the recent Joint Parliamentary Committee on the
Constitution, for a "new Constitution", "a fundamental recast-
ing", "a Constitution rethought and reformulated in terms that are
meaningful to Canadians now."'
And why are we supposed to need this new Constitution?
First, because the Constitution of 1867 (which, despite the
Watsons and the Haldanes, remains the basis of our present
Constitution) is not "distinctively Canadian";2 because it was
"imposed by British overlords", 3 or "granted by a colonial
power", 4 or because the Fathers were "thinking as colonials". 5
*Eugene Forsey, Q.C. (1968), Ph.D., D.C.L., LL.D., D. Litt., F.R.S.C. (1967),
a member of Her Majesty's Senate.
This is the text of a paper delivered at the Annual Dinner of the Dalhousie Law
School on September 24, 1974.
1. Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the
Constitution of Canada, Final Report (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972) at 3, 7
[hereinafter "Constitution Committee Report"].
2. Id. at 1.
3. Jay Walz, "Canada, A Holiday from Tensions?" New York Times, July 9, 1967
at E7.
4. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the
Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada (November
18, 1970) no. 14 at48.
5. Id. at51.
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These allegations are "fond things, vainly imagined, grounded
upon no warranty" of history, "but rather repugnant" to the
historical record.
True, the British North America Act of 1867 is a statute of the
United Kingdom. The British Parliament passed it. But, except for
two points I shall come to in a moment, the British Parliament
simply registered in statutory form the resolutions drawn up, at the
Charlottetown, Quebec and London Conferences of 1864 and
1866-67, by the British North American delegates. At those
Conferences, not one single representative of the British Govern-
ment was even physically present.
What were the two exceptions?
First, the title of the new federation. The British North American
delegates wanted to call it "the Kingdom of Canada. '" 6 The British
Government took fright. "Kingdom" would grate upon the delicate
republican sensibilities of the Americans, with whom the British
Government was most anxious to keep on good terms. So
"Kingdom" had to go. But even then the British Government did
not so much as suggest an alternative title. It was the Fathers
themselves who, at the instance of Sir Leonard Tilley, proposed the
old Anglo-French title "Dominion", as an expression of what they
felt was Canada's "manifest destiny" to reach "from sea to sea and
from the river [St. Lawrence] unto the ends of the earth" 7 [the North
Pole], and as "a tribute to the monarchical principle, which they
earnestly desire to uphold." 8
The second thing in the Act which owes its existence to a British
Government intervention is the sections designed to break a
deadlock between the Senate and the House of Commons. The
Quebec and London Resolutions made no provision for this. The
British Government, remembering how only the threat to swamp the
Lords had carried the First Reform Bill, felt there must be some
swamping power in the Canadian Constitution. It even suggested
clauses. The Fathers refused to accept these, but reluctantly
produced some of their own, which the British Government and
6. G. P. Browne, Documents on the Confederation of British North America
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968) at 265-9, 272, 279, 282 (third and fourth
drafts of the British North America Bill).
7. Psalm 72.
8. Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd Series, vol. I (London: John Murray, 1926) at
394; D. G. Creighton, The Road to Confederation (Toronto: Macmillan, 1964) at
421-24.
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Parliament accepted and wrote into the Act as sections 26-28. 9
These sections, incidentally, have never been successfully invoked.
Mr. Mackenzie tried, twice, in December 1873 and January 1874,
and failed. '0 No one else has ever even tried.
Apart from these two features, neither of them crucial (to put it
mildly), the British North America Act, 1867, is one hundred per
cent "Canadian" (in the post-Confederation sense of that word).
There is one other feature of our Constitution which, though it
appears not in the Act but in the Letters Patent, owes its existence to
the British Government. The Fathers wanted to vest the pardoning
power in the Lieutenant-Governors of the provinces; the British
Government insisted that the exercise of this royal prerogative could
not be entrusted to mere representatives of the Dominion
Government but only to the representative of the Queen herself."
As for the allegation that the Fathers were "colonial-minded":
nothing could be sillier. The Confederation Debates are studded
thick with resounding declarations by Macdonald, Cartier, McGee
and Langevin, that they were creating "a new nationality", "a
great nation", "a powerful nation", "to take our position among
the nations of the world". Macdonald spoke of the relationship with
Britain as a "permanent alliance", and as developing more and
more into "a healthy and cordial alliance."' 2 In 1879-1880,
seeking the establishment of a quasi-diplomatic High Commission-
ership in London, he recurred to the "alliance" concept and
compared Canada's relationship to Britain to the Austro-Hungarian
dual monarchy. 13 These are not the words, nor the tone, of cringing
"colonials", nor of what Macdonald once called "overwashed
Englishmen", mere commuters from Britain.
The second alleged ground for demanding a "new Constitution"
is that Macdonald's Constitution "did not attempt explicitly to set
9. Id. at 415-16,419-20; Browne, supra, note 6 at 170, 186-87, 211-12, 249-50.
10. Eugene Forsey, Freedom and Order (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974)
at 50-7.
11. Brown, supra, note6at 84, 161, 170, 189, 225, 240.
12. Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the British
North American Provinces, 3rd Session, 5th Provincial Parliament of Canada
(Quebec: Hunter, Rose & Co., 1865) at 31, 43-45, 53, 56, 60, 125-26, 128, 139,
145, 363, 369, 372 [hereinafter Confederation Debates]; see also E. P. Whelan,
Confederation of the Provinces Together with a Report of the Speeches delivered by
the Delegates from the Provinces, on Important Public Occasions (Charlottetown:
G. T. Hazard, 1865) at 23-25, 43-46, 52, 72, 93, 101, 119.
13. D. G. Creighton, John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1966) at 271.
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forth any values or goals of that time except to adopt a Constitution
similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom." 
14
This statement is, to begin with, not accurate. Section 91 of the
Act empowers the Parliament of Canada "to make laws for the
peace, order and good government of Canada." Is that not explicit?
Does it set forth no "values or goals"? The Constitution of the
United States affirms that it was adopted "to establish justice,
ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity." ' 15 Our "peace, order and good
government" stands up, I think, very respectably by comparison.
To the British-American statesmen of 1864, looking south at the
Americans, locked in a sanguinary and prolonged Civil War,
"peace" and "order" may well have seemed "values or goals" of
some validity and significance. To the British-American statesmen
of 1866, contemplating the excesses of "Reconstruction" in the
American South, and the none too savoury politics of the American
North, 16 the prosaic phrase "good government" may likewise have
seemed to possess some virtue and some importance. I dare to add
that "peace, order and good government" seem to me "values or
goals" not altogether negligible or irrelevant even for 1974.
And the Committee's "exception" to its statement about the
absence of explicit "values or goals" is no small one: "a
Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom."
That is just the statutory translation of the Fathers' "the well
understood principles of the British Constitution";17 in other words,
constitutional monarchy as against republicanism; parliamentary
cabinet, responsible government as against presidential-
congressional. For a "new nation" in an otherwise solidly
republican, presidential-congressional North America, this was not
only an explicit, but a bold, almost a defiant, statement of a
"value" or "goal." It still is; and its relevance, its importance, is
no less now than it was a hundred and ten years ago. For
parliamentary, cabinet, responsible government remains the most
delicate, the most flexible, the most efficient system of government
yet devised, and the one most responsive to the public will.
14. Constitution Committee Report, supra, note I at 6.
15. Constitution of the United States, Preamble.
16. Confederation Debates, supra, note 12 at 59, 62.
17. Quebec Resolutions, no. 4 in Browne, supra, note 6 at 154.
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The third allegation against Macdonald's Constitution is that it
was a Constitution for a "horse-and-buggy age." This also is not
accurate. It would be more plausible (though still not accurate) to
say, "for a railway-and-telegraph age." In either case, however, it
follows that it won't do for a jet-and-space age.
But in fact Macdonald's Constitution was marvellously framed
precisely to provide for change, for the new, the unexpected, the
unforeseen and unforeseeable. That, indeed, is one reason why it
contained no general amending clause. Parliamentary responsible
government is supple enough to adapt itself to an infinity of change;
and the Macdonald Constitution's federalism could meet, easily and
effectively, almost any challenge thrown down by technological
.development.
These are large claims. To prove that they are warranted requires
us to examine the central features of Macdonald's Constitution. I
suggest that they are eight in number.
First, the monarchy and the "Anglo-Canadian alliance" (as
Professor Creighton has called it). It is important to note that the
Fathers. did not choose these because they were too timid, or too
ignorant, or too stupid, or too unimaginative, to do otherwise. On
the contrary, they chose both the monarchy and the alliance
consciously, deliberately, resolutely, with their eyes wide open.
Macdonald, in the Confederation Debates, took great pains to make
it abundantly clear that the Quebec Conference could have chosen to
reject the monarchy and break the British connection, and that he
was firmly convinced that the British Government would have
raised not the slightest objection, would have placed no obstacle in
the way of a declaration of republican independence. But the
decision to keep the monarchy and the British connection had been
"unanimous." 1 8 Cartier's monarchism was, if anything, even more
emphatic. 19
Nor is this surprising. The British system of government was then
at the very height of its success and reputation. The American
system, in 1864, seemed on the verge of collapse, and even by 1867
its prestige was not high. The Fathers of Confederation were very
close students of American federalism, and Macdonald, in
particular, had a great admiration for many of its features. 20 But for
18. Confederation Debates, supra, note 12 at 33-34; see also, Whelan, supra, note
12 at 44.
19. Id. at 57, 59, 62; see also Whelan, id. at 26, 51, 116.
20. Id. at32; Whelan, id. at43.
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certain of those features, notably "states' rights" and excessive
"democracy", they had nothing but horror. 21 They, and especially
the French-Canadian Fathers, had an equal, or even greater, horror
of abstract principles. To the Loyalists, these recalled the American
Revolution, to the French-Canadians the French. And of course the
British connection was, in the 1860's, and long after, the
indispensable condition of Canadian survival (and, it may be added,
French-Canadian survival). 22 It was almost the sole protection, not
only against American military agression (a menace which
remained almost to the turn of the century), but against American
economic aggression by cancellation of the Reciprocity Treaty and
the bonding privilege (the Intercolonial Railway, central Canada's
insurance against economic strangulation by the United States,
could not have been built without British aid; nor could the CPR).
Britain, to use a favourite phrase of Mr Trudeau's, was the
"countervailing force" which alone could save Canada from being
swallowed by the United States.
The second main feature of Macdonald's Constitution was its
emphasis on a strong central national government. This was a
conscious revulsion from American experience. What was
threatening to destroy American federalism? "States' rights." The
American Founding Fathers had given the central Government and
Legislature only a short list of specific powers; everything else was
"reserved to the states and to the people.''23 Macdonald's verdict
on this was unequivocal: "They commenced at the wrong end."
2 4
So the Canadian Fathers did just the opposite: they gave the
provinces only a short list of specific powers; and
. . . everything not distinctly and exclusively conferred upon the
local governments and legislatures, shall be conferred upon
General Government and Legislature . . . This is precisely the
provision which is wanting in the Constitution of the United
States .... We thereby strengthen the Central Parliament and
make the Confederation one people and one government, instead
of five peoples and five governments . . .one united province,
with the local governments and legislatures subordinate to the
General Government and Legislature. 25
21. Id. at 33, 41, 59, 62, 1002; Whelan, id. at 43-44.
22. Id. at 57-59 (per Cartier).
23. Constitution of the United States, Tenth Amendment; Whelan, id. at 43-44.
24. Confederation Debates, supra, note 12 at 34.
25. Id. at 33, 41-42.
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Elsewhere, Macdonald speaks of "a powerful Central legislature,
and a decentralized system of minor legislatures for local
purposes." 2
6
I have said that Macdonald's Constitution was "marvellously
framed to provide for. . . the new, the unexpected, the unforeseen
and unforeseeable." How? Chiefly by the enacting words of s. 91
of the British North America Act, 1867, Parliament's power "to
make Laws for the Peace, Order and good Government of Canada"
except for matters not explicitly given to the provincial legislatures.
That was the statutory translation of Macdonald's rule that matters
of general interest should come under the "General Government
and Legislature", matters of local interest under the "local
governments and legislatures." So, if a new, unforeseen matter
arose, the test for jurisdiction would be perfectly simple and clear:
"If it's not explicitly given to the provinces, it's Dominion; unless it
is plainly a matter of 'a merely local and private Nature' in one
province."
We are sometimes told that the Dominion and the provinces are
co-ordinate authorities, equal in their respective spheres. Not in
Macdonald's Constitution! For proof, we have only to look, not
merely at the Quebec and London Resolutions, and Macdonald's
speeches, but at the British North America Act itself. It used, for the
the central authority the strong word "Dominion" (not the weak
"federation"), and for the "local" divisions of the country the
weak word "province" (not the strong word "state"). It gave the
Dominion Parliament the power "to make Laws for the Peace,
Order and good Government of Canada", except for "those matters
coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned
exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces." "For greater
certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing
terms of this Section", it added a list of twenty-nine examples of the
exclusive legislative authority already conferred; that wayfaring
judges might not err therein. These included unlimited taxing
power, regulation of trade and commerce, money and banking,
interprovincial and international communications, and criminal law;
all far wider than the corresponding powers (if any) of the United
States Congress. In addition to all this, it gave Parliament power to
bring any local "work" under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Dominion by declaring it to be a work "for the general avantage of
26. Id. at 1002.
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Canada or of two or more of the Provinces." (This power has been
exercised hundreds of times27 ; it is the basis of Dominion control
over the grain trade, which the Courts had ruled to be within
provincial jurisdiction 28 - "The law," said Mr. Bumble, "is a
h'ass.") The Act also provided for unification of all or any of the
laws respecting property and civil rights in the Common Law
provinces if those provinces agreed to surrender jurisdiction to the
Dominion.2 9 (This provision has never been used. It is one of the
Cheshire Cats of our Constitution.) The Dominion Government and
Parliament were given power to implement any obligations of
Canada or any province under treaties between the British Empire
and foreign countries, 30 and to protect the educational rights of
Protestant and Roman Catholic minorities. 31 (The special treaty-
implementing power of Parliament has been virtually wiped out by
the disappearance of the Empire; the power to protect Protestant and
Roman Catholic school rights, invoked in the Manitoba School
Question of the 1890's, proved so ineffective and politically
disastrous that it has become another Cheshire Cat.) Finally,
Parliament was given power to set up a Court of Appeal and other
Dominion Courts, 32 and paramount power over immigration and
agriculture.
33
Nor did the subordination of the provinces to the Dominion end
with these legislative provisions. The Dominion Government was
given power to appoint all judges of County Courts and up (except
the Nova Scotia and New Brunswick Courts of Probate), 34 and to
appoint, instruct and dismiss the Lieutenant-Governors of the
provinces 35 (two have been dismissed). 36 The Lieutenant-Governor
was empowered to reserve provincial bills for the
Governor-General's pleasure (that is, send them to Ottawa in a state
of suspended animation), and unless the Dominion Government
27. Andr6e Lajoie, Le pouvoir ddclaratoire du Parlement (Montreal: Presses de
'Universit6 de Montrgal, 1969) at 123-51.
28. R. v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.R. 434; [1925] 3 D.L.R. 1.
29. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3, s. 94 [hereinafter BNA
Act].
30. Id., s. 132.
31. Id., s. 93(3) and (4).
32. Id., s. 101.
33. Id., s. 95.
34. Id., s. 96.
35. Id., ss. 58, 59, and 55-90.
36. J. T. Saywell, The Office of Lieutenant-Governor (Toronto: University of
Toronto, 1957) at 233-54.
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gave assent within one year, the bills died37 (70 bills have been
reserved; only 14 received Dominion assent). 38 The Dominion
Government was empowered to disallow (wipe off the statute book)
any provincial Act within one year of its receipt at Ottawa 39 (112
Acts have been disallowed). 40 The provinces co-ordinate sovereign
authorities within their jurisdictions? My eye and Betty Martin!
The third basic feature of Macdonald's Constitution was the
preservation of distinctive provincial communities, with wide
powers in cultural and social matters, 41 and with power to change
their Constitutions in any way they saw fit, except that they could
not touch the office of Lieutenant-Governor, 42 which was necessary
to preserve essential Dominion authority, for example in relation to
reservation and disallowance of provincial legislation.
Fourth, of course, comes parliamentary responsible government,
nowhere specifically mentioned, but guaranteed, in fact, by the
preamble's "Constitution similar in Principle to that to the United
Kingdom."
Fifth, and crucially important, is the amazing flexibility of our
Constitution, in blazing contrast to the American. An enormous
field is left to judicial interpretation, to usage, to ordinary
legislation. There is not one syllable in the British North America
Act about the Prime Minister, or the Cabinet, or the dependence of
the Cabinet on a majority in the House of Commons or at the polls.
There is no Bill of Rights. There are no specific guarantees (except
for interprovincial free trade,43 the Quebec Civil Law, 44 the limited
bilingualism of s. 133, the protection of Protestant and Roman
Catholic school rights in s. 93). The whole question of amendment
is left to be worked out by usage. The nation is given room to grow;
the people are left to use their heads, to meet problems as they arise;
37. BNA Act, ss. 55, 57, 90.
38. G. V. La Forest, Reservation and Disallowance of Provincial Legislation
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1955) at 102-15; J.R. Mallory, The Lieutenant-
Governor as a Dominion Officer: The Reservation of the Three Alberta Bills in
1937 (1948), 14 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 502; J. R. Mallory, The
Lieutenant-Governor's Discretionary Powers: The Reservation of Bill 56 (1961),
27 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 518; J. T. Saywell, Reservation Revisited: Alberta
(1937), 27 Can. J. Econ. and Pol. Sci. 367.
39. BNA Act, ss. 56, 90.
40. La Forest, supra, note 38 at 83-101.
41. Whelan, supra, note 12 at 44 (per John A. Macdonald).
42. BNA Act, s. 92(1).
43. Id., s. 121.
44. Id., ss. 92(13), 94.
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not to be "cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd" by a rigid legal text.
Freedom can "slowly broaden down from precedent to precedent."
A sixth main feature of Macdonald's Constitution is the provision
for regional balance, in the Senate. The Senators, appointed by the
Dominion Government, not the provinces, were to give equal
representation not to each province but to each region (the equality
was to be breached only if Newfoundland came in), 45 and were to
be guardians not of provincial jurisdiction (amply protected by the
Courts) but of regional interests within Dominion jurisdiction.
Seventh, Macdonald's Constitution provided, in the Senate, for
"sober second thought"; for revision of "blank and imperfect"
bills from the Commons; for a dike against hasty and ill-considered
legislation. There was in the 1860's, every reason to expect that
Governments would be short-lived, so that no party would ever
build up a large majority in the Senate. This, of course, has not been
so; and the fears of radical legislation from the Commons have
dwindled to almost nothing, so that the Senate's theoretically
unlimited veto has become in fact purely suspensive (though it is
worth remembering that in 1936 the Senate threw out a
constitutional amendment that might have allowed the provinces to
set up tariffs against each other). 46
The eighth main feature of Macdonald's Constitution was a
limited official bilingualism, for the Dominion Parliament and
Courts and the Quebec Legislature and Courts; the degree of
bilingualism called for by the needs of the time; a minimum,
guaranteed to the French-speaking at Ottawa, to the English-
speaking at Quebec; with room for administrative or legislative
adaptations or extensions beyond that minimum at Ottawa and at
Quebec, and elsewhere total freedom in the matter.
Perhaps it was not such a bad Constitution after all! Perhaps it
was not the work of ignoramuses, or fools, or petty provincial
"colonial minded" politicians, or "mixed-up kids"? Indeed it was
not. It was the work of statesmen; knowledgeable, widely read
(Macdonald knew his Bagehot and Hamilton; Cartier can scarcely
have hit by accident on the precise expression, "political
nationality", which was central to Acton's thought on these
matters); shrewd, sensible, realistic, pragmatic; but also wise,
imaginative and far-seeing. Macdonald's Constitution is, in fact,
45. Id., ss. 22, 147.
46. Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada (June 10, 1936) at 469.
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one of the constitutional masterpieces of all time. Indeed,
considering the circumstances in which it was framed, that is but
tepid praise. Here were a group of small communities, sparsely
peopled, scattered over immense distances; separated by natural
barriers that might well have seemed insurmountable, and by deep
divergences of economic interest, language, religion, laws,
education; with poor communications, and those mainly with the
world outside British North America. Against such odds, that the
Fathers of Confederation produced any Constitution at all is
astonishing. That they produced the Constitution they did is
scarcely less than a miracle.
No "ideals"? Nothing to "inspire" us? Nothing "memorable"?
Nothing to fire our imaginations, lift our hearts, expand our minds?
Nothing to "summon up the blood"? Even today, even after the
havoc wrought upon it by the Judicial Committee and by pushful
provinces, Macdonald's Constitution, in most of its main features,
stands: not only one of the oldest, but also one of the most
successful, Constitutions in the whole world.
A hundred and one years ago Macdonald suffered political
eclipse. Eighty-three years ago he made the last journey. But if,
now, in that "undiscover'd country from whose bourn no traveller
returns", he looks down upon his heirs, upon the nation which he,
more than any other, created, and which his Constitution has shaped
and sustained, surely he may well say, "Exegi monumentum aere
perennius", "I have builded a monument more enduring than
bronze." God help us to be worthy of the mighty heritage
Macdonald left us! God grant us wisdom, strength and spirit to
preserve it!
